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Abstract:   
We examine the dynamic effects of credit shocks using a large data set of U.S. 
economic and financial indicators in a structural factor model. The identified credit 
shocks, interpreted as unexpected deteriorations of credit market conditions, 
immediately increase credit spreads, decrease rates on Treasury securities, and cause 
large and persistent downturns in the activity of many economic sectors. Such shocks 
are found to have important effects on real activity measures, aggregate prices, leading 
indicators, and credit spreads. Our identification procedure does not require any timing 
restrictions between the financial and macroeconomic factors, and yields interpretable 
estimated factors. 
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis caused the most important global economic downturn since the
Great Depression. It renewed interest in properly understanding the connection between the
real economy and the financial sector. This is important for various reasons. First, by their
forward-looking nature, asset prices and credit spreads (the difference between corporate
bond yields and yields on same-maturity Treasury securities) should be useful in predicting
fluctuations of economic activity, at least in theory (see, e.g., Philippon, 2008). Studies,
among others, by Stock and Watson (1989, 2003), Gertler and Lown (1999), and more
recently by Mueller (2007), have found that credit spreads do have significant forecasting
power in predicting economic growth.
In addition, while corporate bond yields incorporate information about future economic
conditions, Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajˇsek (2009), henceforth GYZ, show that shocks to
corporate bond yields — based on a broad set of individual firms’s bond prices instead
of relying on common aggregate credit spread indices — cause significant fluctuations in
economic activity. Indeed, the strong tightening in US credit conditions in 2007 and 2008 and
the associated contraction in economic activity that followed suggests that credit conditions
may have important effects on the economy. Understanding the joint dynamics of the real
economy and the financial sector could lead to more timely – and hopefully more pre-emptive
– policy responses. This calls for a comprehensive analysis of the quantitative effects of credit
shocks on US economic variables and requires an empirical framework that is sufficiently rich
to capture the information necessary to account for these joint dynamics.
In this paper, we re-examine the evidence concerning the propagation mechanism of
credit shocks on economic activity and other key macroeconomic variables. We characterize
the dynamic effects of credit shocks using a structural factor model, or Factor-Augmented
VAR (FAVAR) estimated with large panels of U.S. monthly and quarterly data. In contrast
to standard structural VAR models, factor models have a number of advantages: i) they
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permit considering the large amount of information potentially observed by agents, and so
minimize the risk of omitted variable bias; ii) they are not sensitive to the choice of a specific
data series, which may be arbitrary, to represent a general economic concept; iii) they are
less likely to be subject to non-fundamentalness issues raised by Forni et al. (2009); and
iv) they allow us to compute the response of a large set of variables of interest to identified
shocks.
The empirical model is estimated using a large number of US time series. We proceed
in two steps. First, in order to recover the space spanned by structural shocks (including
shocks to credit spreads), we estimate factors as principal components from standardized
data panels. These common factors are supposed to capture the key aggregate fluctuations
in economic and financial series. All economic and financial indicators may be decomposed
into a component contemporaneously related to the common factors, and a series-specific
(idiosyncratic) component which is unrelated to aggregate conditions. Then, a finite-order
VAR approximation of the factors dynamics is estimated. The identification of shocks to
credit conditions is achieved by imposing restrictions on the impact matrix of the structural
shocks on a few selected observable variables, as proposed by Stock and Watson (2005).
This allows us to impose the minimum amount of restrictions necessary to identify shocks
to credit conditions.
The empirical approach is related to that of GYZ, but differs from it in important ways.
In order to determine their credit shocks, GYZ impose potentially strong identifying as-
sumptions. In particular, they assume that no macroeconomic variable, including measures
of economic activity, prices or interest rates can respond contemporaneously to credit shocks.
This assumption may be restrictive, e.g., if changes in credit spreads affect contemporane-
ously overall financial conditions, including interest rates. It may potentially attribute an
overly strong effect of credit spreads on economic variables by preventing a possible contem-
poraneous drop in the yield on riskless securities, which might mitigate the effect of a credit
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tightening. In addition, GYZ assume that the factors summarizing macroeconomic indica-
tors are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the factors summarizing all credit spreads,
regardless of the source of disturbances. To the extent that such assumptions are violated,
their results might be contaminated. In our identification schemes, these assumptions are
relaxed.
Our results show that an unexpected increase in credit spreads causes a significant con-
temporaneous drop in yields of Treasury securities at various maturities, and has a signifi-
cant effect in the same month on other variables such as consumer expectations, commodity
prices, capacity utilization, hours worked, housing starts, etc, in contrast to GYZ’s assump-
tion. This unexpected increase in the external finance premium also results in a significant
and persistent economic slowdown, in the months following the shock. The responses gen-
erated by our identifying procedure yield a realistic picture of the effect of credit shocks
on the economy, and provide valuable information about the transmission mechanism of
these shocks. In addition, we find that the extracted common factors capture an important
dimension of the business cycle movements. Furthermore, we find that credit shocks have
quantitatively important effects on several indicators of real activity and prices, leading in-
dicators, and credit spreads, as they explain a substantial fraction of the variability of these
series. Results from a counterfactual experiment indicate that the credit shocks explain a
large part of the decline in many activity and price series, as well as the Federal Funds Rate
in 2008 and 2009. This is in line with recent findings of Stock and Watson (2012). Finally,
a further advantage of the identification procedure is that it allows us to recover underlying
“structural” factors that have an interesting economic interpretation. Those factors can be
obtained by judiciously combining the initially extracted factors.
Our empirical analysis considers a battery of specifications. These findings are robust
to different data frequencies and identification schemes. The first FAVAR model that we
consider is estimated using a monthly balanced panel. We impose a recursive assumption
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to identify structural shocks. The responses of key macroeconomic series to credit shocks
are found to be qualitatively similar to those from a small-scale VAR model. However,
credit shocks are found to generate a substantially larger share of economic fluctuations in
the FAVAR model than in the small-scale VAR. Given that the VAR likely omits relevant
information, this suggests that the VAR may be misspecified and does not properly capture
the source or propagation of key structural shocks. In addition, the factor model gives a more
complete and comprehensive picture of the effects of credit shocks since the impulse responses
and the variance decomposition of all variables can be obtained. As mentioned above, our
approach produces interpretable common factors. Indeed, the first structural factor is highly
correlated with price measures, the second factor is important for the unemployment rate,
while the third is related to interest rates, and the fourth factor is correlated with credit
spreads.
In the second specification, we consider a mixed-frequencies monthly panel, using also
quarterly data. We impose a recursive identification scheme where we explicitly distinguish
between the monetary policy shocks and credit shocks, although the Federal funds rate (the
instrument of policy) is allowed to respond on impact to credit shocks. The results are similar
to those from the previous model, except that interest rates fall significantly on impact in
response to credit shocks. Again, we obtain interpretable factors.
As a part of robustness analysis, we consider a quarterly balanced panel and identify the
structural shocks using sign restrictions, as well as two FAVAR specifications with observable
factors. Overall, the results are quite robust: in each specification, an adverse shock to
credit conditions causes a significant and persistent economic downturn. This reinforce our
empirical evidence about the real effects of financial disturbances on economic activity.
In the next section, we briefly review some mechanisms linking credit shocks and economic
variables. Section 3 presents the structural factor model and discusses various estimation and
identification issues. The main results are presented in Section 4, followed by the robustness
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analysis. In Section 6, we compare the results to those obtained from smaller-scale structural
VAR models. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix presents the impulse response results after
a monetary policy shock and a description of the data sets.
2 Some Theory
In this section we briefly review various mechanisms that connect financial and economic
variables, and the channels through which shocks on the credit market could affect economic
activity.
Financial frictions are crucial when linking the credit market conditions to economic ac-
tivity. In their presence, the composition of the borrowers’ net worth becomes important due
to the incentive problems faced by the lenders [Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)]: a borrower with a low net worth relative to the amount bor-
rowed has a higher incentive to default. Given this agency problem, the lender demands
a higher premium to provide external funds, which raises the external finance premium.
Therefore, economic downturns and associated declines in asset values tend to produce an
increase in the external finance premium for borrowers holding these assets in their portfolio.
The higher external finance premium, in turn, leads to cuts in investments, and hence in pro-
duction, employment, and thus in the overall economic activity, which induces asset prices
to fall further, and so on. This is essentially the so-called financial accelerator mechanism.
Several other transmission channels, focusing on the credit supply, have also been intro-
duced in the literature. The narrow credit channel focuses on the health of the financial
intermediaries and their agency problems in raising funds. The capital channel can transmit
credit conditions to the economic activity, if banks’ capital is affected. In that case, banks
must reduce the supply of loans, resulting in a higher external finance premium. In summary,
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) identify two channels through which a shock to the external
finance premium can affect the real activity:
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1. Balance sheet channel, according to which a deterioration of a firm’s net worth results in
an increase of its external finance premium, and thus causes a reduction in investment,
employment, production, and prices. This can be broadly seen as affecting the demand
of credit.
2. Bank lending channel, according to which a deterioration of the financial intermediaries’
external finance premium constrains the supply of loans and hence causes a reduction
in economic activity.
More recently, credit risks and their effect on economic conditions have been modeled
in a general equilibrium framework. For instance, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003,
2009, 2013), in a series of papers, augment a medium-size DSGE model similar to Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) with a financial accelerator
mechanism linking conditions on the credit market to the real economy through the external
finance premium following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). They furthermore intro-
duce a so-called “risk shock,” which captures the exogenously time-varying cross-sectional
standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and which directly moves credit
spreads by changing agency costs. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003), find that such
“risk shocks” account for a large share of US GDP fluctuations. In addition, Gilchrist, Ortiz
and Zakrajˇsek (2009) estimate a similar model in which they introduce two financial shocks:
a financial disturbance shock that directly affects the external finance premium (correspond-
ing to the “risk shock” just discussed), and a net worth shock affecting the balance sheet of
a firm. The second shock can be viewed as a credit demand shock, whose effect depends on
the degree of financial market frictions. After estimating the structural model using US data
covering the 1973-2008 period, Gilchrist, Ortiz and Zakrajˇsek (2009) find that both finan-
cial shocks cause an increase in the external finance premium, which, through the financial
accelerator, implies a persistent slowdown in economic activity and in investment.
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3 Econometric Framework in Data-Rich Environment
It is common to estimate the effects of identified macroeconomic shocks using small-scale
vector autoregressions (VARs). However, small-scale VAR models present several issues. Due
to the small amount of information in the model, relative to the information set potentially
observed by agents, the VAR can easily suffer from an omitted variable problem that can
affect the estimated impulse responses or the variance decomposition. Related to that,
Forni et al. (2009) argue that while non-fundamentalness is generic of small scale models,
it is highly unlikely to arise in large dimensional dynamic factor models1. In addition,
a potential problem pertains to the choice of a specific data series to represent a general
economic concept, which may be arbitrary. Finally, even if the previous problems do not
occur, we can produce impulse responses only for the variables included in the VAR.
One way to address all these issues is to take advantage of information contained in
large panel data sets using dynamic factor analysis, and in particular the factor-augmented
VAR (FAVAR) model. The importance of large data sets and factor analysis is now well
documented in both forecasting and structural analysis literature [see Bai and Ng (2008) for
the overview]. In particular, Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) and Boivin, Giannoni and
Stevanovic´ (2009), have shown that incorporating information through a small number of
factors corrects for various empirical puzzles when estimating the effects of monetary policy
shocks.
We consider the static factor model2
Xt = ΛFt + ut, (1)
Ft = Φ(L)Ft−1 + et, (2)
1If the shocks in the VAR model are fundamental, then the dynamic effects implied by the moving average
representation can have a meaningful interpretation, i.e., the structural shocks can be recovered from current
and past values of observable series.
2It is worth noting that the static factor model considered here is not very restrictive since an underlying
dynamic factor model can be written in static form [see Stock and Watson(2005)].
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where Xt contains N economic and financial indicators, Ft represents K unobserved factors
(N >> K), Λ is a N ×K matrix of factor loadings, ut are idiosyncratic components of Xt
that are uncorrelated at all leads and lags with Ft and with the factor innovations et. This
model is an approximate factor model, as we allow for some limited cross-section correlation
among the idiosyncratic components in (1).3
3.1 Estimation
The unknown coefficients in (1)–(2) could in principle be estimated by Gaussian maximum
likelihood using the Kalman filter (or by Quasi ML), as shown in Engle and Watson (1981),
Stock and Watson (1989), and Sargent (1989). This method is however computationally
burdensome and is likely to lead to misspecification when N is very large.4
We adopt instead an alternative estimation approach based on a two-step principal com-
ponents procedure, where factors are approximated in the first step, and the dynamic process
of factors is estimated in the second step. We rely on the result that factors can be obtained
by a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) estimator. Stock and Watson (2002a) prove the
consistency of such an estimator in the approximate factor model when both cross-section
and time sizes, N , and T , go to infinity, and without restrictions on N/T . Moreover, they
justify using Fˆt as regressor without adjustment. Bai and Ng (2006) furthermore show that
PCA estimators are
√
T consistent and asymptotically normal if
√
T/N → 0. Inference
should take into account the effect of generated regressors, except when T/N goes to zero.
The principal components approach is easy to implement and does not require very
3We assume that only a small number of largest eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of common com-
ponents may diverge when the number of series tends to infinity, while the remaining eigenvalues as well as
the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of specific components are bounded. See Bai and Ng (2008) for an
overview of the modern factor analysis literature, and the distinction between exact and approximate factor
models.
4Recently, significant improvements have nonetheless been proposed to this approach. For instance the
Kalman filter speedup by Jungbacker and Koopman (2008), using principal components for starting values
and then a single pass of the Kalman filter by Giannone, Reichlin, and Sala (2004), and principal components
for starting values then use EM algorithm to convergence by Doz, Giannone, and Reichlin (2006).
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strong distributional assumptions. Simulation exercises have shown that likelihood-based
and two-step procedures perform quite similarly in approximating the space spanned by la-
tent factors5. However, since the unobserved factors are first estimated and then included
as regressors in the VAR equation (2), and given that the number of series in our appli-
cation is small, relative to the number of time periods, the two-step approach suffers from
a “generated regressors” problem. To get an accurate statistical inference on the impulse
response functions that accounts for uncertainty associated to factors estimation, we use the
bootstrap procedure as in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005).
3.2 Identification of structural shocks
A key objective of this paper is to identify the effect of shocks to credit conditions on the
economy be imposing a minimal number of restrictions. To identify the structural shocks, we
employ the contemporaneous timing restrictions procedure proposed in Stock and Watson
(2005). This procedure identifies credit shocks by restricting only the responses on impact of
a few economic indicators. This approach has the advantage of leaving the dynamics of the
factors unconstrained, and allows the identified structural shocks to have contemporaneous
effects on all factors driving our panel of indicators.
The approach adopted here contrasts with GYZ, who assume that credit shocks do not
have a contemporaneous effect on any of the economic factors and indicators, including
interest rates. Furthermore, unlike GYZ who estimate two orthogonal sets of factors — those
explaining a panel of economic activity indicators, and factors related to credit spreads 6— we
do not need to make such a distinction, and thus do not need to assume that financial factors
are orthogonal to other economic factors. Finally, contrary to other identification strategies
5See, Doz, Giannone and Reichlin (2006). Moreover, Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) estimated their
model using both two-step principal components and single-step Bayesian likelihood methods, and obtained
essentially the same results.
6In GYZ, the credit shock is identified as an innovation to the first “financial factor”obtained as a principle
component to a large panel of credit spread data.
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that have been adopted in analyses using FAVAR models, we do not need to impose that any
factor be observed factor, nor do we rely on the interpretation of a particular latent factor
to characterize the responses of economic indicators to structural shocks.7
To identify our credit shocks, we start by inverting the VAR process of factors (2),
assuming stationarity, and substitute the resulting expression into (1), to obtain the moving-
average representation of Xt:
Xt = B(L)et + ut, (3)
where B (L) ≡ Λ[I −Φ(L)L]−1. We assume that the number of static factors, K, is equal to
the number of structural shocks and that the factor innovations et are linear combinations
of structural shocks εt:
εt = Het, (4)
where H is a nonsingular square matrix and E[εtε
′
t] = I. Using (4) to replace et in (3) gives
the structural moving-average representation of Xt:
Xt = B
?(L)εt + ut, (5)
where B?(L) ≡ B(L)H−1 = Λ[I − Φ(L)L]−1H−1. To identify the structural shocks εt, we
arrange the data in Xt and impose contemporaneous timing restrictions on the impact matrix
in (5). Specifically, we assume that certain structural shocks do not affect the first few
7In Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) and Boivin, Giannoni and Stevanovic´ (2009), the authors impose
a short-term interest rate as an observed factor, and the monetary policy shock is identified as innovation
in the interest rate VAR equation, after performing a Choleski decomposition.
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indicators in Xt within the period, so that the impact matrix takes the form
B?0 ≡ B? (0) =

x 0 · · · 0
x x
. . . 0
x x
. . . 0
x x · · · x
...
...
. . .
...
x x · · · x

,
where x stands for unrestricted elements. It is important to note that our identifying as-
sumptions are imposed on the effects of structural shocks on particular indicators in our
data set. They do not require latent factors not to respond contemporaneously to structural
shocks.
To estimate the matrix H, we proceed as in Stock and Watson (2005), noting that
B?0:Kεt = B0:Ket implies B
∗
0:KB
∗′
0:K = B0:KΣeB
′
0:K , where B0:K contains the first K rows of
B0 ≡ B (0) = Λ, B?0:K = B0:KH−1, and Σe is the covariance matrix of et. Since B?0:K is
a K × K lower triangular matrix, then it must be the case that B∗0:K can be obtained by
performing a Choleski decomposition of (B0:KΣeB
′
0:K), i.e.: B
∗
0:K = Chol(B0:KΣeB
′
0:K). It
follows that H = (B∗0:K)
−1B0:K , or
H = [Chol(B0:KΣeB
′
0:K)]
−1B0:K . (6)
To estimate H, we just replace B0:K and Σe with their estimates in (6).
The impulse responses to structural shocks in εt are obtained using (5). This identification
procedure is similar to the standard recursive identification in VAR models, except that the
series-specific term ut is absent in VARs. By imposing K(K − 1)/2 restrictions, we just-
identify the K structural shocks.
11
3.3 Data and main specifications
In our application, we use two specifications of the FAVAR involving very different identifying
restrictions and also an increasingly large number of economic and financial indicators. The
time span for all panels starts in 1959M01 and ends in 2009M06. All series are initially
transformed to induce stationarity. The description of the series and their transformation is
presented in the Appendix.
Common proxies of the external finance premium of borrowing firms are the credit spreads
for non-financial institutions. Our benchmark measure will be the 10-year B-spread (i.e. the
difference between BAA bond yields and Treasury bond yields), although we considered as
alternatives the 10-year A-spread and the 1-year B-spread. Table 1 and Figure 7 summarize
these measures. Figure 7 reveals clearly that credit spreads, especially the 1-year B-spread,
are positively correlated with the unemployment rate. This correlation confounds however
both the effects of current economic conditions on credit spreads and the effects of the latter
credit spreads on economic conditions. The exercises that follow attempt to disentangle these
effects and in particular to insulate the quantitative effects on the economy of a disruption
in credit conditions.
In our first specification, we consider a monthly balanced panel containing 124 monthly
U.S. economic and financial series. This is an updated version of the data set in Bernanke,
Boivin and Eliasz (2005). We impose a recursive structure on the following four economic
indicators: [piCPI , UR, FFR, B-spread]. This assumption implies that the inflation rate
based on the consumer price index (piCPI), the unemployment rate (UR) and the Federal
Funds rate (FFR) are the only indicators that do not respond immediately to a surprise
increase in the B-spread (measured by the 10-year B-spread), which is interpreted as the
credit shock. This identification scheme is related to the identification strategy in GYZ in
the sense that the shock is seen as an unexpected increase in the external finance premium.
However, it is important to remark that all indicators other than piCPI , UR and FFR may
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respond contemporaneously to the credit shock. In particular, we do not impose that all the
measures of economic activity, prices and interest rates respond only with lag to the credit
shock. Furthermore, the shock in our approach is a disturbance to the last element of the
vector εt. It captures the surprise innovation in the B-spread, after accounting for fluctuations
in past common factors as well as in the current factors that explain the behavior of piCPI ,
UR, and FFR. The impact response of the B-spread is equal to the standard deviation of
the credit shock, which is function of the relevant factor loadings in Λ and the corresponding
elements in the rotation matrix H.
The second specification augments the monthly panel above with 58 important quarterly
U.S. macroeconomic series, to yield a mixed-frequencies monthly panel of 182 indicators, over
the same period.8 The goal is to use the informational content from quarterly indicators so
as to better approximate the space spanned by structural shocks, and thus to achieve a more
reliable identification of these shocks.
Compared to the previous specification, we also use different identifying restrictions to
estimate the credit shocks. Specifically, we assume a recursive structure in the following
indicators [piPCE, UR, ∆C, ∆I, FFR], where the credit shock and the monetary policy
shock are ordered respectively fourth and fifth in εt. This particular identification scheme
implies that the inflation rate based on the Personal Consumption Expenditure Price Index
(piPCE), the Unemployment Rate (UR) and real Consumption growth (∆C) do not respond
immediately to both unexpected credit shocks and monetary policy shocks. To identify
the credit shock, we allow Investment growth (∆I) to respond immediately to the credit
shock, while it does not react to the monetary policy contemporaneously. The underlying
idea is that credit shocks can affect physical investment decisions in the same month, even
though we don’t let them affect piPCE, UR, or ∆C in the same period. Finally, we let the
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) respond immediately to all other shocks, including the credit
8The mixed-frequencies panel is obtained using an EM algorithm as in Stock and Watson (2002b), and
Boivin, Giannoni and Stevanovic´ (2009).
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shock. Note that a measure of the external finance premium is not required to enter in this
recursive structure. Again, the impact response of the credit spread is equal to the standard
deviation of the identified credit shock, which is function of the relevant factor loadings in
Λ and the corresponding elements in the rotation matrix H.
4 Results
In this section, we present the main empirical results from our two main FAVAR specifica-
tions. The next section provides more robustness results from additional specifications. We
could in principle plot the impulse responses of all variables contained in the informational
panel Xt but we will focus on a subset of economic and financial indicators of interest. In
all cases, the impulse to the component of εt corresponding to the credit shock is of size 1.
The lag order in VAR dynamics in (2) is set to 3. Finally, the 90% confidence intervals are
computed using 5000 bootstrap replications.
4.1 FAVAR 1 and monthly balanced panel
We estimate the first specification of the FAVAR using the monthly balanced panel. The
recursive identification scheme, [piCPI , UR, FFR, B-spread], implies extracting four static
factors from the data, Xt. Figure 2 plots the impulse responses of the level of key variables to
the credit shock. On impact, the B-spread (lower right panel) rises by 19.2 basis points rela-
tive to its initial value. This unexpected increase in the external finance premium generates
a significant and very persistent economic downturn, in line with the transmission channels
discussed above. For example, industrial production (IP) falls little on impact but then by
as much as 2% within the first 12 months, before returning to its initial level after 4 years.
Employment falls by around 0.5% over the first year and remains significantly below the
initial level for at least 3 years. Average weekly hours worked and capacity utilization also
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decrease, but they do fall significantly on impact. Real personal consumption falls signifi-
cantly and persistently along with consumer credit, though the consumption decline is more
muted (about 0.3% after a year) than that of production and consumer credit, in line with
theories emphasizing the intertemporal smoothing of consumption. The labor market indi-
cators such as the unemployment rate and average unemployment duration rise significantly
for about 3 years, while employment and wages (average hourly earnings) decline.
The price indices based on the CPI, core CPI, and PPI, show almost no change on impact
and present a very persistent decline thereafter, settling four years later at a permanently
lower level than would have obtained without the credit shock. Note that while our identi-
fication restriction prevents the CPI-based inflation to change contemporaneously with the
credit shock, the responses of inflation based on the core CPI or the PPI are allowed to
respond contemporaneously. The fact that they show no response on impact provides some
comfort to our identifying assumption.
The leading indicators, such as consumer expectations, new orders, housing starts, and
commodity prices, all react negatively on impact, and remain below their initial level for
at least a year following the credit shock. Similarly, 3-month and 5-year yields on Treasury
securities fall markedly on impact and in years following the shock. While the Federal funds
rate is prevented from declining on impact, by assumption, it does fall in the subsequent
months, reaching a drop of about 40 basis points one year after the shock. The assumption of
no contemporaneous change in the Federal funds rate could be justified by the fact that such
changes occur mostly at pre-scheduled FOMC dates, and thus may not respond immediately
to credit spread shocks. We will however assess below how empirically realistic such an
assumption is by considering alternative identifying restrictions. Note finally, that as interest
rates decrease the demand for monetary aggregate M1 increases, while M2 remains roughly
unchanged.
Some of these responses, in particular those involving leading indicators and interest
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rates, contrast sharply with those of GYZ, who assumed that no macroeconomic variable
could respond on impact to credit shocks. Yet, even though long-term rates fall and thereby
partially offset the adverse effects of the credit shock by stimulating consumption and in-
vestment, economic activity remains depressed following the negative credit shock. Indeed
our estimate of the effect of the credit shock on industrial production is not too different
from that of GYZ.9 Our arguably more realistic identifying assumptions allow us to obtain
quantitatively reasonable responses of a large set of variables. This reinforces GYZ’s con-
clusion that disturbances to US credit markets can have an important impacts on economic
activity.
Table 2 shows the importance of credit shocks in explaining economic fluctuations during
our 1959-2009 sample. The middle column reports for key macroeconomic series, xi,t, the
contribution of the credit shock to the variance of the forecast error of the respective series
at a 48-month horizon. Interestingly, the credit shock has important effects on many crucial
variables: it explains more than 50% of the forecast error variance of industrial production,
consumer credit, capacity utilization rate, labor market series, some leading indicators and
credit spreads.
Table 2 also shows that aggregate disturbances explain overall a large fraction of fluctua-
tions in key economic time series. Indeed, the third column of Table 2 contains the fraction
of the variability of each series explained by the common factors, i.e., the R2 obtained from
the regression of xi,t on λ
′
iFt for each indicator i, where λ
′
i denotes the i-th row of matrix
Λ in equation (1). The common components explain a sizeable fraction of the variability in
most of the indicators listed, especially for industrial production, prices, financial indicators,
average unemployment duration, capacity utilization and consumer expectations, though
variables such the exchange rate seem to be driven mostly by other factors.
9GYZ find that industrial production falls by about one percent over a 24-month period following a shock
corresponding to a 10-50 basis points increase in the credit spreads.
16
4.1.1 Interpretation of factors
While the common factors considered do capture an important dimension of the business
cycle movements in most indicators, as just discussed, how can one interpret the common
factors? Another interesting feature of our identification approach is that it allows us to
obtain the rotation matrix H which can be used to interpret the estimated factors. Recall
from Section 3.2, that structural shocks are a linear combination of residuals, εt = Het.
Using this hypothesis, we can rewrite the system (1)-(2) in its structural form
Xt = Λ
?F ?t + ut (7)
F ?t = Φ
?(L)F ?t−1 + εt (8)
where F ?t = HFt, Λ
? = ΛH−1, and Φ?(L) = HΦ(L)H−1. Hence, given the estimates of
Ft and H, we can obtain an estimate of the structural factors, Fˆ
?
t = HˆFˆt, associated with
the structural shocks εt. Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between the estimated
rotated factors, F ?t , and the variables used in the recursive identification scheme. The factors
and associated variables are plotted in Figure 3. The results reveal that the rotation by Hˆ
yields estimated structural factors very close to the observed indicators used in the recursive
identification scheme: the first rotated factor is highly correlated with piCPI , the second is
related to the unemployment rate, the third to the Federal funds rate and the last to our
credit spread measure.
4.1.2 How important were credit spreads in the Great Recession?
Having estimated “structural” factors, it is now possible to use our model to evaluate the
extent to which credit spreads contributed to the economic downturn in the Great Recession.
To do so, we simulate our estimated model in structural form, excluding the credit shock,
and compare the resulting simulated series to the actual data. In Figure 4, we plot the actual
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and simulated series of interest from 2007M1 to 2009M6, the date at which the recession
officially ended.10 The data are simulated using the system (7)-(8) where the last element
of εt is set to zero in the FAVAR 1 from 2007M1 to 2009M6, and the initial conditions for
the factors are given by the estimated value of F ∗t in 2006M12.
Figure 4 reveals that credit shocks were important during the Great Recession for many
real activity and price series. The simulation (indicated by black dashed lines) shows that a
downturn in many activity and price indicators would have taken place even in the absence
of credit spread shocks. In response to this downturn, short-term interest rates would have
fallen. However a recovery would have been underway starting in late 2008, and short-term
rates would have begun to normalize by early 2009.
The jump in credit spreads, in particular in the Fall of 2008, was responsible for causing a
much deeper recession and a collapse in many indicators. The simulation shows for example
that credit spread shocks reduced industrial production and employment in mid-2009 by more
than 20% and 7%, respectively, compared to the levels that would have obtained without
credit spread shocks. Similarly, credit spread shocks are estimated to have increased the
unemployment rate by more than 3 percentage points, and reduced the consumer price
index by about 3%, by mid-2009. As a result, the Federal funds rate was lowered to near
zero. These findings appear in line with Stock and Watson (2012) who point to exceptionally
large shocks associated with financial disruptions and uncertainty in explaining the economic
collapse during the Great Recession.
4.2 FAVAR 2 and mixed-frequencies panel
To assess the robustness of the results discussed above, we consider an alternative identi-
fication scheme and incorporate additional data. Our second specification uses the mixed-
frequencies monthly panel and impose the recursive identification based on the following
10According to the NBER, the Great Recession lasted from December 2007 to June 2009.
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ordering [piPCE, UR, ∆C, ∆I, FFR]. As mentioned previously, the credit shock and the
monetary policy shock are ordered respectively fourth and fifth in εt. An advantage of this
specification compared to the FAVAR 1 is that it allows the Federal funds rate to respond
contemporaneously to identified shocks to credit conditions. The latter shocks are assumed
to cause a contemporaneous change in physical investment but no contemporaneous response
of inflation based on the PCE deflator, unemployment, or real consumption. A potential
downside of this specification, however, is that the identified shock to credit conditions is
less directly related financial market data.
The impulse responses to an unexpected disturbance to credit conditions are presented
in Figure 5. The impact response of the B-spread is a little more than 20 basis points, i.e.,
a response similar to the one considered in FAVAR 1. In contrast to the previous specifica-
tion, the Federal funds rate declines significantly on impact, now that its contemporaneous
response is left unrestricted. This results in a large impact response of the 3-month Treasury
bill yield and of the S&P composite common stock dividend yield. However, the impulse
responses of other variables do not appear to differ much from those of the previous specifica-
tion. Indeed, the unexpected increase in the external finance premium generates a significant
and persistent economic slowdown and an associated large and persistent decline in price
indexes. Industrial production, capacity utilization and employment present a significant
downturn for about 18 months after the shock. The unemployment rate and the average
unemployment duration both increase persistently, while employment and salary indicators
decline. The leading indicators of economic activity — housing starts, new orders, and
consumer expectations — react negatively and significantly on impact.
Figure 6 displays the impulse responses of some monthly indicators constructed from the
quarterly observed variables. These are GDP components and two price indexes. We can
see that the GDP and PCE deflators decline in a persistent and significative fashion, though
the responses of the other variables are less precise. However, we notice that after a small
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positive impact response, most aggregates decline progressively.
Table 4 reports the contribution of the credit shock to the variance of the forecast error
in key indicators, as well as the R2 statistics measuring the importance of common factors
in explaining fluctuations in these indicators. As for the FAVAR 1, the R2 statistics are
fairly high for many indicators, suggesting that aggregate disturbances explain overall a
large fraction of fluctuations in these economic time series.
In the FAVAR 2, the credit shock still reveals important effects on many crucial variables.
While the credit shock still explains a relatively large fraction of the variance of the forecast
error of prices, financial indicators including Federal funds rate, the capacity utilization
rate and consumer credit, it explains a somewhat smaller fraction for real economic activity
measures than was the case in the FAVAR 1 specification. For instance, the credit shock
accounts for 29% of the forecast error variance of industrial production and 40% of the
forecast error variance of employment at the 48-month horizon.
4.2.1 Interpretation of factors
As for the previous specification, we can check how the rotation matrix changes the cor-
relation structure between the estimated factors and the economic indicators used in the
recursive identification scheme. Table 5 contains the correlation coefficients and Figure 7
plots the rotated factors and the corresponding series. We find that the first structural factor
is important for the price series and the second for unemployment rate. The third factor is
related to the consumption series and negatively correlated with UR. The fourth factor is
less correlated with identification variables, while the fifth factor is related to the Federal
funds rate.
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4.2.2 Effects of credit spreads in the Great Recession
Again, we can assess how important the estimated credit spreads were in deepening the
downturn in the 2007-2009 period. Figures 8 and 9 compare actual data (solid blue lines)
with the simulated series of interest (dashed black lines) for the period 2007M1 to 2009M6,
using the system (7)-(8) and setting the shock to the credit conditions (i.e., the fourth
element of εt) to zero.
As for the previous specification, Figures 8 and 9 show that credit shocks were important
in deepening the Great Recession for most real activity and price series. For instance, they
reduced industrial production and employment in mid-2009 by more than 10% and 4%,
respectively. In comparison to the FAVAR 1 specification, however, the tightening in credit
conditions had a somewhat smaller effect. The reason is that in the FAVAR 2 specification,
the short-term interest rates would not have fallen enough, in the absence of credit shocks,
to induce a rapid recovery.
5 Further robustness analysis
To provide further robustness analysis of the results described above, we estimate several
other FAVAR specifications, using among others only quarterly data, and considering al-
ternative representations of the FAVAR model in which some factors are assumed to be
observed.
5.1 FAVAR with sign restrictions and a quarterly balanced panel
In this specification, we consider an updated version of balanced quarterly panel from Boivin
and Giannoni (2006) containing 220 quarterly U.S. series for the same period, and identify
the credit shock using a sign restrictions strategy. To obtain the initial orthogonalized
innovations we start from the recursive structure on the indicators [piPCE, ∆GDP , ∆C, ∆I,
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FFR] entering the data set Xt which we assumes satisfies:
Xt ' B?(L)εt. (9)
Then, we generate an orthogonal matrix Q, using a QR decomposition, such that
Xt ' B˜?(L)ε˜t,
where B˜?(L) ≡ B?(L)Q and ε˜t ≡ Q′εt. The following sign restrictions are imposed on the
impact matrix B˜?(0):
∂(piPCE,t)
∂(εCSt )
≤ 0, ∂(∆GDPt)
∂(εCSt )
≤ 0, ∂(∆Ct)
∂(εCSt )
≤ 0, ∂(∆It)
∂(εCSt )
<
∂(∆Ct)
∂(εCSt )
. (10)
Hence, we require that the impact responses of PCE inflation, and of the growth rates of real
GDP, consumption and investment to a contractionary credit shock be non positive. The
last restriction means that the investment (nonresidential) responds more than consumption.
The results were obtained after simulating 10,000 orthogonal matrices. Among them, 924
were retained as they respected all the sign restrictions. The impulse responses computed
with the median orthogonal matrix are presented with solid black lines in Figure 10, and
all retained impulse responses are represented by the gray areas. The dynamic effects of
the credit shock are similar to what we have observed in the previous specifications. The
identified shock to credit conditions causes a sizeable economic downturn: production, em-
ployment, consumer credit, and prices decline, while the unemployment rate and average
unemployment duration rise. Interest rates, housing starts, new orders, and the capacity
utilization rate react negatively on impact, while credit spreads respond positively, as ex-
pected. However, compared to the previous monthly models, the effects of credit shocks
appear less persistent.
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In Table 6 we present variance decomposition and R2 results. In contrast with previous
approaches, the credit shock has a smaller effect on most of the variables. It explains
between 20 and 30 percent of the forecast error in the quarterly NAPM production index,
the Federal funds rate, and some leading indicators, but has a small effect on prices and
monetary measures. The R2 results suggest that the extracted factors explain an important
fraction of the variability in these series. Table 7 presents the correlation structure between
rotated factors and the series used in the recursive identification. These are also plotted in
Figure 11. The interpretation of structural factors is quite similar to the previous FAVAR 2
specification.
5.2 FAVARs with observed factors
We now consider FAVAR models that include some observable factors in the transition
equation along with the latent factors, as in Boivin, Bernanke and Eliasz (2005) and in
Boivin, Giannoni and Stevanovic´ (2009). The model is
Xt = Λ
FFt + Λ
Y Yt + ut (11) Ft
Yt
 = Φ (L)
 Ft−1
Yt−1
+ et, (12)
where Ft contains K latent factors and Yt has M observable series. In case of the two-step
estimation procedure, the issue is to separate the space spanned by observable and unobserv-
able factors. We considered two alternative approaches.11 In either case, the identification
11In the first approach, following Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005), Yt contains the Federal Funds Rate
(FFR). As these authors, we split the sample into a block of ‘slow moving’ series that do not respond
immediately to a shock on FFR, and another consisting of ‘fast moving’ variables that are not restricted.
The latent factors are obtained from the following steps: (i) Let Cˆ(Ft, Yt) be the K principal components
of Xt; (ii) Let X
S
t be the subset of ‘slow moving’ variables. Let C
∗(Ft) be the K principal components of
XSt ; (iii) Define Fˆt = Cˆ(Ft, Yt) − βˆY Yt where βˆY is obtained by least squares estimation of the regression
Cˆ(Ft, Yt) = βCC
∗(Ft) + βY Yt + at; (iv) Get the loadings by regressing Xt on Fˆt and Yt.
In the second approach, following Boivin, Giannoni and Stevanovic´ (2009), we estimate the latent factors
through an iterative application of the principal components estimator. Starting from an initial estimate of
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of structural shocks is achieved by imposing a recursive structure on the VAR residuals in
(12). In our context, Yt contains a proxy of the external finance premium and may contain
other observable series. For each estimation procedure, we tried several specifications:
• Yt contains only one of the credit spreads;
• Yt contains a credit spread and the Federal funds rate, and considering different order-
ings in Yt;
• we include different numbers of latent factors in Ft.
Overall, the results are very similar to those presented here. Each specification reveals
a significant and persistent economic downturn following the credit shock, and depending
on the identification procedure, the interest rates and leading indicators respond immedi-
ately to the shock. This reinforces our empirical evidence about the real effects of financial
disturbances on economic activity.
6 Relevance of Large Data Sets
Our analysis has so far considered the effects of credit shocks in FAVAR models that exploit
information from large panels of data series. Besides the fact that FAVAR models yield a
more complete picture of the effects of particular shocks on the economy, a key justification
for using such models is that they have been shown to address a number of empirical puzzles
obtained in analyses of empirical models (VARs) involving a small number of data series,
especially in response to unanticipated monetary policy shocks. A natural question is thus
whether information from large data sets is also relevant to properly characterize the response
of credit shocks. To address this question, we compare our findings to those obtained from
Ft, F
0
t which is the K first principal components of Xt: (i) Regress Xt on Fˆ
0
t and Yt to obtain Λˆ
F,j and
ΛˆY,j ; (ii) Compute X˜jt = Xt − ΛˆY,jYt; (iii) Update Fˆt as the first K principal components of X˜t. The main
advantage of this procedure is that it does not rely on any temporal assumption between the observed factors
and the informational panel. By construction, Fˆt is contemporaneously uncorrelated with Yt.
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standard structural VAR models. Our benchmark VAR model, similarly to Mueller (2007),
has the following recursive ordering [piCPI , UR, FFR, 10yBS], where piCPI is the inflation
rate calculated as the first difference in the log of the consumer price index (CPI), UR is
again the unemployment rate, FFR is the Federal funds rate and 10yBS is the 10-year
B-spread. Hence, inflation, unemployment and the Federal funds rate cannot respond in the
same month to an unexpected increase in the credit spread. This identifying assumption is
the same as the one adopted in the FAVAR 1, except that we now consider only a small set
of data series.
Figure 12 shows the effects of an unexpected increase in the 10-year B-spread that is such
that the peak increase is 19.2 basis points, i.e., the same magnitude as the one considered in
FAVAR 1. The shock causes again a significant and persistent increase in the unemployment
rate, a fall in the price level, and a persistent reduction of the Federal funds rate. The
responses are however smaller than the ones obtained in the context of the FAVAR that
exploits information from a large data set. The peak response of the unemployment rate is
less than 12 basis points in the VAR, compared to a response almost twice as large in the
FAVAR 1. Similarly the decline in the CPI is more than double in the FAVAR 1 model than
in the VAR. Since the small-scale VAR is a restricted version of the FAVAR 1, we view the
VAR-based impulse responses as potentially more distorted than the ones obtained from the
FAVAR.
As the benchmark specification may be restrictive, we check the validity of our results
by studying several alternative orderings and using credit spreads: 1yBS (1-year B-spread)
and 10yAS (10-year A-spread). Table 8 lists all the SVAR models considered, and Figure 13
compares their results. This figure shows that the impulse responses are robust to different
empirical measures of the external finance premium and to the ordering between monetary
policy and credit shocks.
While Figures 12–13 show the response of the unemployment rate, the CPI and the
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Federal funds rate to credit shocks, they do not allow us to determine how important credit
shocks are in generating economic fluctuations. Table 9 reports the contribution of credit
shocks to the total variance of these series. Based on small-scale structural VARs, the credit
shocks appear to contribute again less to fluctuations in the CPI (less than 6% at most), and
to the unemployment rate (around 20% at most) than is the case with the FAVAR model.
One interesting finding is that the FAVAR impulse responses to credit shocks are quali-
tatively in line with the ones from the VARs, for the indicators included in the VAR. This
suggests that after controlling for past inflation, unemployment and Federal funds rates,
shocks to the credit market can be reasonably well captured by innovations in the credit
spread. This contrasts with analyses of monetary policy shocks [e.g., Bernanke, Boivin and
Eliasz (2005) and Boivin, Giannoni, Stevanovic (2009)] which show important qualitative
differences between VAR and FAVAR responses of many variables. However, to obtain a
correct gauge of the quantitative effect of credit shocks in explaining aggregate fluctuations
also requires that the transmission mechanism of all shocks, including monetary shocks, be
well specified. Given that relevant information is likely omitted in small-scale VARs, calcu-
lations based on the FAVAR models are likely to be more reliable. These results indicate
that credit shocks are indeed much more important in explaining economic fluctuations than
the small-scale VAR models suggest.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have re-examined the evidence on the propagation mechanism of credit
shocks to economic activity. The analysis has been done in a data-rich environment using
several specifications of a structural factor model. The structural shocks were identified
by imposing a minimal number of restrictions on the matrix of impact responses of several
economic indicators.
The common factors are shown to explain an important fraction of the variability in
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observable variables and thus capture a sizeable dimension of the business cycle movements.
Moreover, our identification approach allows us to recover underlying structural factors which
have an interesting economic interpretation. A variance decomposition analysis suggests
that credit shocks have important effects on several real activity measures, price indicators,
leading indicators, and credit spreads.
The results show that an unexpected increase of a measure of the external finance pre-
mium generates a statistically and economically significant economic downturn. This down-
turn is persistent and broad based, and results in a significant increase in the unemployment
rate and a gradual decrease in price indices. It takes place despite a rapid and significant de-
cline in interest rates. Leading indicators including interest rates and measures of confidence
respond strongly and significantly on impact. Our identifying assumptions that leave uncon-
strained the contemporaneous responses of most indicators yield a more realistic picture of
the effect of credit shocks on the economy than has been found to date, and provide valuable
information about the transmission of these shocks. A simulation of the Great Recession
period reveals that the jump in credit spreads, in particular in the Fall 2008, was responsible
for causing a dramatic deepening of the recession. Finally, our results are largely robust to
different data frequencies and identification schemes.
27
References
[1] Bai, J., and S. Ng (2006), “Confidence intervals for diffusion index forecasts and infer-
ence for factor-augmented regressions,” Econometrica 74: 1133–1150.
[2] Bai, J., and S. Ng (2008), “Large Dimensional Factor Analysis,” Foundations and Trends
in Econometrics 3(2): 89–163.
[3] Bernanke, B.S. and M. Gertler (1995), “Inside the black box: The credit channel of
monetary policy transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 27–48.
[4] Bernanke, B.S., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist (1999), “The Financial Accelerator in a
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” in The Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by
J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford, pp. 1341–1369. Elsevier Science B.V. Amsterdam.
[5] Bernanke, B.S., J. Boivin and P. Eliasz (2005), “Measuring the effects of monetary pol-
icy: a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) approach,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 120: 387–422.
[6] Boivin, J., Giannoni M.P. (2006), “DSGE Models in a Data-Rich Environment,” NBER
working paper no. 12772.
[7] Boivin, J., Giannoni M.P., and D. Stevanovic´ (2009), “Monetary Transmission in a
Small Open Economy: More Data, Fewer Puzzles,” manuscript, UQAM.
[8] Christiano, L.J., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans (2005), “Nominal Rigidities and the
Dynamic Effect of a Shock to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Political Economy 113(1):
1–45.
[9] Christiano, L.J., R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2003), “The Great Depression and the
Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35(6): 1119–
1198.
28
[10] Christiano, L.J., R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2009), “Shocks, Structures, or Monetary
Policies? The Euro Area and U.S. After 2001,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 32: 2476–2506.
[11] Christiano, L.J., R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2013), “Risk Shocks,” NBER working
paper no. 18682, January.
[12] Doz, C., D. Giannone, and L. Reichlin (2006), “A Quasi Maximum Likelihood Approach
for Large Approximate Dynamic Factor Models,” ECB Working Paper 674.
[13] Engle, R.F. and M.W. Watson (1981), “A one-factor multivariate time series model of
metropolitan wage rates,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 76: 774–781.
[14] Forni, M., D. Giannone, M. Lippi, L. Reichlin (2009), “Opening The Black Box: Struc-
tural Factor Models With Large Cross Sections,” Econometric Theory 25(05): 1319–
1347.
[15] Gertler, M. and C.S. Lown (1999), “The Information in the High-Yield Bond Spread
for the Business Cycle: Evidence and Some Implications,” Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 15: 132–150.
[16] Giannone, D., L. Reichlin and L. Sala (2004), “Monetary policy in real time,” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, 161–200.
[17] Gilchrist, S., V. Yankov and E. Zakrajˇsek (2009), “Credit Market Shocks and Economic
Fluctuations: Evidence From Corporate Bond and Stock Markets,” Journal of Monetary
Economics 56: 471–493.
[18] Gilchrist, S., A. Ortiz and E. Zakrajˇsek (2009), “Credit Risk and the Macroeconomy:
Evidence From an Estimated DSGE Model,” Mimeo, Boston University.
29
[19] Jungbacker, D. and S.J. Koopman (2008), “Likelihood-Based Analysis for Dynamic
Factor Models,” manuscript, Tinbergen Institute.
[20] Kilian, L. (1998), “Small-Sample Confidence Intervals for Impulse Response Func-
tions,”Review of Economics and Statistics 80(2): 218–230.
[21] Mueller, P. (2007), “Credit Spreads and Real Activity,”Mimeo, Columbia Business
School.
[22] Philippon, T. (2009), “The Bond Market’s Q,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, forth-
coming.
[23] Sargent, T.J. (1989). “Two Models of Measurements and the Investment Accelera-
tor,”Journal of Political Economy 97: 251–287.
[24] Smets, Frank, and Raf Wouters (2007), “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles:
A Bayesian DSGE Approach,” American Economic Review 97(3): 586-606.
[25] Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson (1989), “New indexes of coincident and leading economic
indicators,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 351–393.
[26] Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson (2002a). “Forecasting Using Principal Components from
a Large Number of Predictors,”Journal of the American Statistical Association 97:
1167–1179.
[27] Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson (2002b), “Macroeconomic Forecasting Using Diffusion
Indexes,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20: 147–162.
[28] Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson (2003), “Forecasting Output and Inflation: The Role of
Asset Prices,” Journal of Economic Literature 41: 788–829.
[29] Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson (2005), “Implications of Dynamic Factor Models for
VAR Analysis,” manuscript, Harvard University.
30
[30] Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson (2012), “Disentangling the Channels of the 2007-2009
Recession,” NBER WP 18094.
Table 1: Proxies for the external finance premium
Series description Time span
FYAAAC BOND YIELD: MOODY’S AAA CORPORATE 1959M01-2009M06
FYBAAC BOND YIELD: MOODY’S BAA CORPORATE 1959M01-2009M06
FYGT1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,1-YR. 1959M01-2009M06
FYGT10 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,10-YR. 1959M01-2009M06
FYFF INTEREST RATE: FEDERAL FUNDS (EFFECTIVE) 1959M01-2009M06
Credit spreads
10Y B-spread FYBAAC-FYGT10 1959M01-2009M06
10Y A-spread FYAAAC-FYGT10 1959M01-2009M06
1Y B-spread FYBAAC-FYGT1 1959M01-2009M06
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Table 2: Variance decomposition and R2 in FAVAR 1
Variables Variance decomposition R2
Industrial production 0.5289 0.7140
CPI: total 0.0591 0.7966
CPI: core 0.1223 0.6123
T-Bill: 3-month 0.1509 0.8839
T-Bond: 5-year 0.1144 0.9132
Unemployment rate 0.2615 0.7089
M1 0.1418 0.0919
M2 0.0308 0.1149
Consumer credit 0.6492 0.1778
Exchange rate: average 0.0326 0.0530
Commodity price index 0.3135 0.5214
PPI: finished goods 0.0424 0.5949
Capacity utilization rate 0.7469 0.7476
Real Pers. Cons. 0.2360 0.1401
Real Pers. Cons.: services 0.2343 0.1283
Avg. unemployment duration 0.4248 0.7597
Employment 0.5946 0.2879
Avg weekly hours 0.4948 0.3819
Avg hourly earnings 0.3949 0.2164
Housing starts 0.6002 0.4676
New orders 0.4452 0.2473
S&P’s CCS: dividend yield 0.1605 0.7529
Consumer expectations 0.3188 0.5338
FFR 0.1347 0.8957
B-spread: 10y 0.7727 0.6574
Notes: The second column reports for key macroeconomic series, xi,t, the contribution of the credit shock to the variance
of the forecast error of the respective series at a 48-month horizon. The third column contains the fraction of the variability
of this series explained by the common factors, i.e., the R2 obtained from the regression of xi,t on λ
′
iFt for each indicator i,
where λ
′
i denotes the i-th row of matrix Λ in equation (1).
Table 3: Correlation between rotated factors and variables in recursive identification in
FAVAR 1
F ∗1,t F
∗
2,t F
∗
3,t F
∗
4,t
CPI 0.8925 0.2935 0.4822 0.1220
UR -0.0135 0.7906 -0.1070 0.7752
FFR 0.7282 0.6328 0.7091 0.4062
Bspread -0.1529 0.4996 -0.4542 0.7073
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Table 4: Variance decomposition and R2 in FAVAR 2
Variables Variance decomposition R2
Industrial production 0.2929 0.7313
CPI: total 0.5139 0.6263
CPI: core 0.5656 0.6211
T-Bill: 3-month 0.6723 0.8640
T-Bond: 5-year 0.6611 0.8948
Unemployment rate 0.1915 0.6946
M1 0.1601 0.1090
M2 0.1899 0.0323
Consumer credit 0.4470 0.1893
Exchange rate: average 0.0941 0.0270
Commodity price index 0.7903 0.4731
PPI: finished goods 0.5114 0.3077
Capacity utilization rate 0.7220 0.7405
Real Pers. Cons. 0.0559 0.3819
Real Pers. Cons.: services 0.1930 0.1086
Avg. unemployment duration 0.3727 0.6242
Employment 0.3980 0.3037
Avg weekly hours 0.2261 0.3015
Avg hourly earnings 0.4290 0.3364
Housing starts 0.4582 0.4329
New orders 0.2519 0.2500
S&P’s CCS: dividend yield 0.5861 0.6147
Consumer expectations 0.1652 0.5088
FFR 0.6016 0.8802
B-spread: 10y 0.7096 0.6416
Real GDP 0.0737 0.9338
Real GDP: goods 0.0890 0.8860
Real GDP: services 0.0518 0.8769
Employees compensation 0.0641 0.8812
Gov. consumption 0.1032 0.6009
Investment 0.0926 0.8599
Invst.: nonresidential 0.0714 0.9012
GDP deflator 0.1940 0.6547
PCE deflator 0.1302 0.7935
Notes: The second column reports for key macroeconomic series, xi,t, the contribution of the credit shock to the variance
of the forecast error of the respective series at a 48-month horizon. The third column contains the fraction of the variability
of this series explained by the common factors, i.e., the R2 obtained from the regression of xi,t on λ
′
iFt for each indicator i,
where λ
′
i denotes the i-th row of matrix Λ in equation (1).
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Table 5: Correlation between rotated factors and variables in recursive identification in
FAVAR 2
F ∗1,t F
∗
2,t F
∗
3,t F
∗
4,t F
∗
5,t
PCE 0.8908 0.1351 -0.1274 -0.2687 0.3597
UR 0.0764 0.8319 -0.7171 0.4242 0.7006
C -0.1319 0.0245 0.2848 0.0138 -0.0909
I 0.3431 0.0235 0.3874 0.0303 -0.0247
FFR 0.5801 0.4356 -0.4304 -0.3412 0.7672
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Table 6: Variance decomposition and R2 in FAVAR with quarterly balanced panel
Variables Variance decomposition R2
NAPM Production index 0.2175 0.7841
Industrial production 0.1611 0.5992
CPI: total 0.0136 0.9387
CPI: core 0.0149 0.8644
T-Bill: 3-month 0.2098 0.8817
T-Bond: 5-year 0.1504 0.8786
Unemployment rate 0.1093 0.6689
M1 0.0699 0.3082
M2 0.0746 0.2859
Consumer credit 0.1182 0.3148
Exchange rate: average 0.1609 0.2084
Commodity price index 0.0395 0.6728
PPI: finished goods 0.0163 0.8151
Capacity utilization rate 0.1402 0.8069
Real Pers. Cons. 0.1514 0.6304
Real Pers. Cons.: services 0.0841 0.5347
Avg. unemployment duration 0.1239 0.5748
Employment 0.1288 0.6847
Avg weekly hours 0.3115 0.4829
Avg hourly earnings 0.0682 0.2523
Housing starts 0.2278 0.5628
New orders 0.2526 0.7960
S&P’s CCS: dividend yield 0.3802 0.1922
Consumer expectations 0.0752 0.6804
FFR 0.2270 0.9006
B-spread: 10y 0.1045 0.6476
Real GDP 0.1895 0.6872
Real GDP: goods 0.1782 0.4800
Real GDP: services 0.0514 0.2914
Employees compensation 0.1295 0.7626
Gov. consumption 0.1692 0.0108
Investment 0.0908 0.4821
Invst.: nonresidential 0.0968 0.3160
GDP deflator 0.0152 0.8620
PCE deflator 0.0072 0.9589
Notes: The second column reports for key macroeconomic series, xi,t, the contribution of the credit shock to the variance
of the forecast error of the respective series at a 16-quarter horizon. The third column contains the fraction of the variability
of this series explained by the common factors, i.e., the R2 obtained from the regression of xi,t on λ
′
iFt for each indicator i,
where λ
′
i denotes the i-th row of matrix Λ in equation (1).
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Table 7: Correlation between rotated factors and identification variables in FAVAR with
quarterly balanced panel
F ∗1,t F
∗
2,t F
∗
3,t F
∗
4,t F
∗
5,t
PCE 0.9792 -0.1773 0.5913 0.7062 0.4970
GDP -0.1477 0.8290 -0.1886 -0.1546 -0.1882
C -0.2992 0.7274 -0.0521 -0.2495 -0.1399
I 0.0670 0.4110 -0.2252 0.1753 -0.0973
FFR 0.7070 -0.1671 0.5193 0.9145 0.6658
Table 8: VAR models used to study effects and identification of financial shock
Models Wald causaility ordering
Benchmark [pit, URt, FFRt, 10yBSt]
Model 1 [pit, URt, 10yBSt, FFRt]
Model 2 [pit, URt, FFRt, 1yBSt]
Model 3 [pit, URt, FFRt, 10yASt]
Table 9: Variance decomposition: contribution of the credit shock
Variables Benchmark Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CPI 0.0467 0.0569 0.0227 0.0322
Unemployment rate 0.1945 0.1694 0.0477 0.0933
FFR 0.1055 0.1572 0.0882 0.0778
B-spread: 10y 0.9156 0.8968
B-spread: 1y 0.6069
A-spread: 10y 0.9437
36
Figure 1: Measures of the external finance premium and unemployment
Notes: The figure shows several measures of credit spreads (defined in Table 1) and the unemployment rate.
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Figure 2: Dynamic responses of monthly variables to credit shock in FAVAR 1
Notes: The figure plots the impulse responses of the level of key variables to the credit shock identified through the recursive
identification scheme, [piCPI , UR, FFR, B-spread], where the credit shock is ordered last. The dotted lines indicate the 90%
confidence intervals computed using 5000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 3: Rotated factors and variables used in recursive identification in FAVAR 1
Notes: The figure plots the estimated structural factors and the variables in the recursive identification scheme, [piCPI , UR,
FFR, B-spread].
39
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
IP
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
CPI
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
CORE CPI
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−6
−4
−2
0
3m TREASURY BILLS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
10y TREASURY BONDS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−2
0
2
4
UNEMPLOYMENT
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
M1
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
M2
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
CONSUMER CREDIT
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
EXCHANGE RATE average
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
COMMODITY PRICE INDEX
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
PPI: FINISHED GOODS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
CAPACITY UTIL RATE
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
REAL PERSONAL CONSUMPTION
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
REAL PERS CONS: SERVICES
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−5
0
5
10
15
AVG UNEMP DURATION
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
EMPLOYMENT
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
AVG WEEKLY HOURS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
AVG HOURLY EARNINGS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
HOUSING STARTS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
NEW ORDERS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
S&PS: DIVIDEND YIELD
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−6
−4
−2
0
FFR
07M1 07M6 08M1 08M6 09M1 09M6
−2
0
2
4
6
Bspread10y
 
 
True Simulated
Figure 4: Simulated monthly data without credit shocks from FAVAR 1
Notes: The figure plots the actual and simulated series of interest from 2007M1 to 2009M6, the date at which the recession
officially ended. The data are simulated from the structural factor representation excluding the credit shock.
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses of monthly variables to credit shock in FAVAR 2
Notes: The figure plots the impulse responses of the level of key variables to the credit shock identified through the recursive
identification scheme, [piPCE , UR, ∆C, ∆I, FFR], where the credit shock is ordered fourth. The dotted lines indicate the 90%
confidence intervals computed using 5000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 6: Dynamic responses of constructed monthly indicators to credit shock in FAVAR 2
Notes: The figure plots the monthly impulse responses of the level of key quarterly variables to the credit shock identified
through the recursive identification scheme, [piPCE , UR, ∆C, ∆I, FFR], where the credit shock is ordered fourth. The dotted
lines indicate the 90% confidence intervals computed using 5000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 7: Rotated factors and variables used in recursive identification in FAVAR 2
Notes: The figure plots the estimated structural factors and the variables in the recursive identification scheme, [piPCE , UR,
∆C, ∆I, FFR].
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Figure 8: Simulated monthly data without credit shocks from FAVAR 2
Notes: The figure plots the the actual and simulated series of interest from 2007M1 to 2009M6, the date at which the recession
officially ended. The data are simulated from the structural factor representation excluding the credit shock.
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Figure 9: Simulated monthly indicators without credit shocks from FAVAR 2
Notes: The figure plots the the actual and simulated monthly measures of the quarterly series of interest from 2007M1 to
2009M6, the date at which the recession officially ended. The data are simulated from the structural factor representation
excluding the credit shock.
45
0 4 8 12 16
−4
−2
0
2
NAPM ProdIndex
0 4 8 12 16
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
IP
0 4 8 12 16
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
CPI
0 4 8 12 16
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
PCE durables
0 4 8 12 16
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
3m TREASURY BILLS
0 4 8 12 16
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
5y TREASURY BONDS
0 4 8 12 16
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
UNEMPLOYMENT
0 4 8 12 16
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
M1
0 4 8 12 16
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
M2
0 4 8 12 16
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
CONSUMER CREDIT
0 4 8 12 16
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
EXCHANGE RATE Can
0 4 8 12 16
−10
−5
0
5
COMMODITY PRICE INDEX
0 4 8 12 16
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
PPI: FINISHED GOODS
0 4 8 12 16
−2
−1
0
1
CAPACITY UTIL RATE
0 4 8 12 16
−5
0
5
10
15
x 10−3R AL PERSONAL CONSUMPTION
0 4 8 12 16
−5
0
5
10
x 10−3REAL PERS CONS: SERVICES
0 4 8 12 16
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
AVG UNEMPL. DURATION
0 4 8 12 16
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−3EMPLOYMENT
0 4 8 12 16
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3AVG WEEKLY HOURS
0 4 8 12 16
−2
0
2
4
6
x 10−3AVG HOURLY EARNINGS
0 4 8 12 16
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
HOUSING STARTS
0 4 8 12 16
−10
−5
0
5
10
NEW ORDERS
0 4 8 12 16
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
S&P COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK Price
0 4 8 12 16
−4
−2
0
2
4
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
0 4 8 12 16
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
FFR
0 4 8 12 16
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Bspread10y
0 4 8 12 16
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Real GDP
0 4 8 12 16
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Reag GDP: gds
0 4 8 12 16
−5
0
5
10
x 10−3Real GDP: svc
0 4 8 12 16
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Employees Compensation
0 4 8 12 16
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3Gov Consumption
0 4 8 12 16
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Investment
0 4 8 12 16
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Invst: nonresidential
0 4 8 12 16
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
GDP deflator
0 4 8 12 16
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
PCE deflator
Figure 10: Impulse responses to credit shock in FAVAR with sign restrictions
Notes: The solid black lines plot the impulse responses of the level of key variables to the credit shock identified through the
sign restrictions identification scheme in (10), using the median rotation matrix. The shaded gray areas are not confidence
bands; they plot all the impulse responses that satisfy the sign restrictions in (10).
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Figure 11: Rotated factors and variables used FAVAR with sign restrictions identification
scheme
47
0 48
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
x 10−3 CPI
0 48
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
UNEMP
0 48
−0.35
−0.3
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
FFR
0 48
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
B spread 10y
Figure 12: Impulse responses to a 20 bp credit spread shock in benchmark SVAR
Notes: The figure plots the impulse responses of the level of the variables to a 20 basis point credit shock identified through the
recursive identification scheme, [piCPI , UR, FFR, 10yBS], where the credit shock is ordered last. The dashed lines indicate
the 90% confidence intervals computed using 5000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to a 20 bp credit spread shock in several SVAR models
Notes: The figure plots the impulse responses of the level of the variables to a 20 basis point credit shock in the SVAR models
listed in Table 8.
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Appendix A: Dynamic effects of the monetary policy shock
Here, we present the effects of the monetary policy using the same identification scheme as
above, and using the monthly balanced panel and the mixed-frequencies monthly panel. In
the first specification, FAVAR 1, the monetary policy shock is ordered third, and in FAVAR
2 it is the last element of the vector of identified structural shocks.
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Figure 14: Dynamic responses of monthly variables to a monetary policy shock
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Figure 15: Dynamic responses of monthly variables to monetary policy shock using mixed-
frequencies data
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Figure 16: Dynamic responses of constructed monthly indicators to monetary policy shock
using mixed-frequencies data
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Appendix B: Data Sets
The transformation codes are: 1 - no transformation; 2 - first difference; 4 - logarithm; 5 -
first difference of logarithm; 0 - variable not used in the estimation (only used for transform-
ing other variables). A * indicate a series that is deflated by the Gross Private Domestic
Investment Price Deflator (series # 183). A ** indicate a series that is deflated with the
GDP deflator (series # 181).
No. Series Code T-Code Series Description
Real output and income
1 IPS10 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - TOTAL INDEX
2 IPS11 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - PRODUCTS, TOTAL
3 IPS12 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - CONSUMER GOODS
4 IPS13 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS
5 IPS14 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
6 IPS18 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE CONSUMER GOODS
7 IPS25 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - BUSINESS EQUIPMENT
8 IPS29 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DEFENSE AND SPACE EQUIPMENT
9 IPS299 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - FINAL PRODUCTS
10 IPS306 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - FUELS
11 IPS32 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - MATERIALS
12 IPS34 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DURABLE GOODS MATERIALS
13 IPS38 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE GOODS MATERIALS
14 IPS43 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - MANUFACTURING (SIC)
15 PMP 1 NAPM PRODUCTION INDEX (PERCENT)
16 PMI 1 PURCHASING MANAGERS’ INDEX (SA)
17 UTL11 1 CAPACITY UTILIZATION - MANUFACTURING (SIC)
18 YPR 5 PERS INCOME CH 2000 $,SA-US
19 YPDR 5 DISP PERS INCOME,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
20 YP@V00C 5 PERS INCOME LESS TRSF PMT CH 2000 $,SA-US
21 SAVPER 2 PERS SAVING,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
22 SAVPRATE 1 PERS SAVING AS PERCENTAGE OF DISP PERS INCOME,PERCENT,SAAR-US
Employment and hours
23 LHEL 5 INDEX OF HELP-WANTED ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS (1967=100;SA)
24 LHELX 4 EMPLOYMENT: RATIO; HELP-WANTED ADS:NO. UNEMPLOYED CLF
25 LHEM 5 CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, TOTAL (THOUS.,SA)
26 LHNAG 5 CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, NONAGRIC.INDUSTRIES (THOUS.,SA)
27 LHTUR 1 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: (
28 LHU14 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.5 TO 14 WKS (THOUS.,SA)
29 LHU15 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.15 WKS + (THOUS.,SA)
30 LHU26 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.15 TO 26 WKS (THOUS.,SA)
31 LHU27 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.27 WKS + (THOUS,SA)
32 LHU5 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.LESS THAN 5 WKS (THOUS.,SA)
33 LHU680 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: AVERAGE(MEAN)DURATION IN WEEKS (SA)
34 LHUEM 5 CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: UNEMPLOYED, TOTAL (THOUS.,SA)
35 AHPCON 5 AVG HR EARNINGS OF PROD WKRS: CONSTRUCTION ($,SA)
36 AHPMF 5 AVG HR EARNINGS OF PROD WKRS: MANUFACTURING ($,SA)
37 PMEMP 1 NAPM EMPLOYMENT INDEX (PERCENT)
38 CES002 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - TOTAL PRIVATE
39 CES003 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - GOODS-PRODUCING
40 CES004 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - NATURAL RESOURCES AND MINING
41 CES011 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - CONSTRUCTION
42 CES015 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - MANUFACTURING
43 CES017 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - DURABLE GOODS
44 CES033 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - NONDURABLE GOODS
45 CES046 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - SERVICE-PROVIDING
46 CES048 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - TRADE, TRANSPORTATION, AND UTILITIES
47 CES049 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - WHOLESALE TRADE
48 CES053 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - RETAIL TRADE
49 CES088 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
50 CES140 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM PAYROLLS - GOVERNMENT
51 CES151 1 AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - GOODS-PRODUCING
52 CES153 1 AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - CONSTRUCTION
53 CES154 1 AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - MANUFACTURING
54 CES155 1 AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - MANUFACTURING OVERTIME HOURS
55 CES156 1 AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - DURABLE GOODS
56 CES275 5 AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - GOODS-PRODUCING
57 CES277 5 AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - CONSTRUCTION
58 CES278 5 AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE
NONFARM PAYROLLS - MANUFACTURING
Real Consumption
59 JQCR 5 REAL PERSONAL CONS EXP QUANTITY INDEX (200=100), SAAR
60 JQCNR 5 REAL PERSONAL CONS EXP-NONDURABLE GOODS QUANTITY INDEX (200=100), SAAR
61 JQCDR 5 REAL PERSONAL CONS EXP-DURABLE GOODS QUANTITY INDEX (200=100), SAAR
62 JQCSVR 5 REAL PERSONAL CONS EXP-SERVICES QUANTITY INDEX (200=100), SAAR
Real inventories and orders
63 MOCMQ 5 NEW ORDERS (NET) - CONSUMER GOODS & MATERIALS, 1996 DOLLARS (BCI)
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64 MSONDQ 5 NEW ORDERS, NONDEFENSE CAPITAL GOODS, IN 1996 DOLLARS (BCI)
65 PMDEL 1 NAPM VENDOR DELIVERIES INDEX (PERCENT)
66 PMNO 1 NAPM NEW ORDERS INDEX (PERCENT)
67 PMNV 1 NAPM INVENTORIES INDEX (PERCENT)
Housing starts
68 HUSTSZ 4 HOUSING STARTS: TOTAL NEW PRIV HOUSING UNITS (THOUS.,SAAR)
69 HSFR 4 HOUSING STARTS:NONFARM(1947-58);TOTAL FARM&NONFARM(1959-)(THOUS.,SA
70 HSMW 4 HOUSING STARTS:MIDWEST(THOUS.U.)S.A.
71 HSNE 4 HOUSING STARTS:NORTHEAST (THOUS.U.)S.A.
72 HSSOU 4 HOUSING STARTS:SOUTH (THOUS.U.)S.A.
73 HSWST 4 HOUSING STARTS:WEST (THOUS.U.)S.A.
Exchange rates
74 EXRCAN 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: CANADA (CANADIAN $ PER U.S.$)
75 EXRUK 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: UNITED KINGDOM (CENTS PER POUND)
76 EXRUS 5 UNITED STATES;EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE(MERM)(INDEX NO.)
Price indexes
77 PMCP 1 NAPM COMMODITY PRICES INDEX (PERCENT)
78 PW561 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX: CRUDE PETROLEUM (82=100,NSA)
79 PWCMSA 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:CRUDE MATERIALS (82=100,SA)
80 PWFCSA 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:FINISHED CONSUMER GOODS (82=100,SA)
81 PWFSA 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX: FINISHED GOODS (82=100,SA)
82 PWIMSA 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:INTERMED MAT.SUPPLIES & COMPONENTS(82=100,SA)
83 PUNEW 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS (82-84=100,SA)
84 PUS 5 CPI-U: SERVICES (82-84=100,SA)
85 PUXF 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS FOOD (82-84=100,SA)
86 PUXHS 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS SHELTER (82-84=100,SA)
87 PUXM 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS MIDICAL CARE (82-84=100,SA)
88 PUXX 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS FOOD AND ENERGY (82-84=100,SA)
89 PUC 5 CPI-U: COMMODITIES (82-84=100,SA)
90 PUCD 5 CPI-U: DURABLES (82-84=100,SA)
91 PU83 5 CPI-U: APPAREL & UPKEEP (82-84=100,SA)
92 PU84 5 CPI-U: TRANSPORTATION (82-84=100,SA)
93 PU85 5 CPI-U: MEDICAL CARE (82-84=100,SA)
Stock prices
94 FSDJ 5 COMMON STOCK PRICES: DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE
95 FSDXP 1 S&P’S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: DIVIDEND YIELD (% PER ANNUM)
96 FSPCOM 5 S&P’S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: COMPOSITE (1941-43=10)
97 FSPIN 5 S&P’S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: INDUSTRIALS (1941-43=10)
98 FSPXE 1 S&P’S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO (%,NSA)
Money and credit quantity aggregates
99 FM1 5 MONEY STOCK: M1(CURR,TRAV.CKS,DEM DEP,OTHER CK’ABLE DEP)(BIL$,SA)
100 FM2 5 MONEY STOCK:M2(M1+O’NITE RPS,EURO$,G/P&B/D MMMFS&SAV&SM TIME DEP(BIL$,
101 CCINRV 5 CONSUMER CREDIT OUTSTANDING - NONREVOLVING(G19)
Miscellaneous
102 UOMO83 1 COMPOSITE INDEXES LEADING INDEX COMPONENT INDEX OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
UNITS: 1966.1=100 NSA, CONFBOARD AND U.MICH.
Interest rates and bonds
103 FYGM3 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,3-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA)
104 FYGM6 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,6-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA)
105 FYGT1 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,1-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
106 FYGT10 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,10-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
107 FYGT20 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,20-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
108 FYGT3 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,3-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
109 FYGT5 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,5-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
110 FYPR 1 PRIME RATE CHG BY BANKS ON SHORT-TERM BUSINESS LOANS(% PER ANN,NSA)
111 FYAAAC 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY’S AAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM)
112 FYAAAM 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY’S AAA MUNICIPAL (% PER ANNUM)
113 FYAC 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY’S A CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM,NSA)
114 FYAVG 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY’S AVERAGE CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM)
115 FYBAAC 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY’S BAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM)
116 SFYGM3 1 FYGM3-FYFF
117 SFYGM6 1 FYGM6-FYFF
118 SFYGT1 1 FYGT1-FYFF
119 SFYGT5 1 FYGT5-FYFF
120 SFYGT10 1 FYGT10-FYFF
121 SFYAAAC 1 FYAAAC-FYFF
122 SFYBAAC 1 FYBAAC-FYFF
123 FYFF 1 INTEREST RATE: FEDERAL FUNDS (EFFECTIVE) (% PER ANNUM,NSA)
124 Bspread10Y 1 FYBAAC-FYGT10
Quarterly indicators
125 GDPRC@US.Q 5 NIA REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (CHAINED-2000), SA - U.S.
126 GDPGDR.Q 5 REAL GDP-GDS,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
127 GDPSVR.Q 5 REAL GDP-SVC,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
128 GDPSR.Q 5 REAL GDP-STRUC,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
129 WS@US.Q 5** NIA NOMINAL TOTAL COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES, SA - U.S.
130 CR.Q 5 REAL PCE,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
131 JQCDR.Q 5 REAL PCE-DUR,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
132 UJQCDMVR.Q 5 REAL PCE-DUR-MV&PARTS,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
133 JQCDFHER.Q 5 REAL PCE-DUR-FURN&HH EQUIP,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
134 JQCDOR.Q 5 REAL PCE-DUR-OTH,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
135 JQCNR.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
136 JQCNFR.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR-FOOD,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
137 JQCNCSR.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR-CLO&SHOES,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
138 JQCNER.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR-GASOLINE FUEL OIL&OTH ENERGY GDS,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
139 JQCNEGAOR.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR-GASOLINE FUEL OIL&OTH ENERGY GDS-GASOLINE&OIL,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SAAR-US
140 JQCNEFACR.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR-GASOLINE FUEL OIL&OTH ENERGY GDS-FUEL OIL&COAL,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SAAR-US
141 JQCNOR.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR-OTH,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
142 JQCSVR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
143 JQCSVHSR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-HOUSING,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
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144 JQCSVHOPR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-HH OPS,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
145 JQCSVHOPEAGR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-HH OPS-ELEC&GAS,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
146 JQCSVHOPOR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-OTH HH OPS,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
147 JQCSVTSR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-TRNSPRT,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
148 JQCSVMR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-MEDICAL CARE,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
149 JQCSVRECR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-RECR,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
150 JQCSVOR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC-OTH,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
151 JQCENERGYR.Q 5 REAL PCE-ENERGY GDS&SVC,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SAAR-US
152 JQCXFAER.Q 5 REAL PCE EX FOOD&ENERGY,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SAAR-US
153 CGRC@US.Q 5 NIA REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE & GROSS INVESTMENT (CHAINED-2000), SA - U.S.
154 I.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
155 IF.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
156 IFNRE.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED NONRES,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
157 IFNRES.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED NONRES-STRUC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
158 IFNRESC.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-NONRES-STRUC-COML&HEALTH CARE,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
159 IFNRESMFG.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-NONRES-STRUC-MFG,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
160 IFREE.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-EQUIP,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
161 IFRESPEMF.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-RES-STRUC-MFAM,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
162 IFRESPESF.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-RES-STRUC-1 FAM,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
163 IFRESPE.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-RES-STRUC-PERMANENT SITE,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
164 IFRES.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-RES-STRUC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
165 IFRE.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED RES,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
166 IFNREEO.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED-NONRES-EQUIP&SW-OTH,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
167 IFNREET.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED-NONRES-EQUIP&SW-TRNSPRT,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
168 IFNREEIND.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED-NONRES-EQUIP&SW-IND,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
169 IFNREEIPO.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED-NONRES-EQUIP&SW-INFO PROC&SW-OTH,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
170 IFNREEIPCS.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED-NONRES-EQUIP&SW-SW,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
171 IFNREEIPCC.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED-NONRES-EQUIP&SW-COMP&PERI,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
172 IFNREEIP.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED-NONRES-EQUIP&SW-INFO PROC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
173 IFNREE.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED NONRES-EQUIP#&SW,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
174 IFNRESO.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-NONRES-OTH STRUC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
175 IFNRESMI.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-NONRES-STRUC-MINING EXPLORATION,SHAFTS,&WELLS,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
176 IFNRESP.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-NONRES-STRUC-POWER&COMM,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
177 II.Q 1 GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-CH IN PRIV INVENT,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
178 IIF.Q 1 GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-CH IN PRIV INVENT-FARM,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
179 M.Q 5 IMPORTS OF GDS&SVC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
180 X.Q 5 EXPORTS OF GDS&SVC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
181 PGDP@US.Q 5 NIA PRICE DEFLATOR - GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, SA - U.S.
182 PCP@US.Q 5 NIA PRICE DEFLATOR - PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE, SA - U.S.
183 USCEN:PDII.Q 0 GROSS PRIV DOM INVESTMENT PRICE DEFLATOR, SA - U.S.
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